

In our text we examine the relationship between practical wisdom and ethical states in Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics*. The goal of our work is to define the function of practical wisdom in ethical virtue. We gradually analyze the individual parts of definition of ethical virtue from EN II, 6, that is, that virtue is a state concerned with choice which holds the mean relative to us in such a way as a man of practical wisdom would define it. After the analysis of state concerned with choice and practical wisdom we arrive at the determination of practical wisdom as the source of virtuous action; only practical wisdom can be the criterion that pronounces what is bad and good; desire in itself is not capable of deliberation. Following from this a new question arises: how can practical wisdom influence the irrational part of the soul, which is the seat of desire? Practical wisdom, having no direct influence on desire, uses ethical virtue-temperance as its intermediary. This induces in irrational desire the intention to follow practical wisdom and thus practical wisdom becomes master of desire. We see the contribution of our work firstly in defining the function of practical wisdom in Aristotelian Ethics with greater accuracy and secondly in establishing temperance as a necessary condition of the other virtues and rational action itself.